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ABSTRACT 
Rural nonfarm development plays a key role in generating employment in many developing countries. 
Clustering is an important form of industrial organization in the rural nonfarm sector. Based on a primary 
survey of both urban and rural handloom weaver clusters in Ethiopia, one of the country’s most important 
rural nonfarm sectors, this paper examines the mechanism and performance of clustering. That cluster-
based handloom production survives even in remote rural areas illustrates its vitality in restricted 
environments. In the absence of financial institutions, clustered producers set up interconnected trade 
credit linkages to ease working capital constraints. Moreover, geographical clustering enables 
entrepreneurs with limited capital to enter the business through shared workspaces and fine division of 
labor. Despite the viability of the clustering model of production operating in harsh environments, an 
improvement in infrastructure can further enhance firm performance in a cluster. Our survey indicates 
that producers in electrified towns work longer hours than those in towns without electricity. In addition, 
the rental cost of shared lit workspaces is minimal, attracting more poor entrepreneurs to participate in 
handloom production than would otherwise be possible.  
Keywords: industrial clustering, productivity, handloom weavers, Ethiopia 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rural nonfarm development is a strategic priority for many developing countries during their economic 
transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society. It plays an important role in generating local 
employment and linking with other sectors (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007). Despite its 
importance, there remains a great knowledge gap on how rural nonfarm activities are organized in rural 
areas, especially in more remote places. One major challenge in developing the rural nonfarm sector is 
credit constraints. The poor usually have neither enough financial resources nor access to formal credit to 
start a business in the nonfarm sector. Therefore, a common view in the literature is that a functioning 
financial market is a precondition for industrial development (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic 2006; Banerjee and Newman 1993; Goldsmith 1969; King and Levine 1993; McKinnon 
1973; Rajan and Zingales 1998). Yet in many developing countries, development of a functioning 
financial market is often a daunting task in itself. Rather than wait for financial markets to develop, it 
would be useful to identify alternative approaches of industrial development that adapt to and arise from 
an environment that lacks formal institutions.  
Industrial clustering is one way of overcoming such constraints. A cluster is a sectoral and 
geographical concentration of enterprises (Porter 2000; Schmitz 1995). Adam Smith (1904) was the first 
to chronicle the economic gains available to firms through the division of labor, a key feature of industrial 
clustering. Through the division of the production process into many incremental steps in an industrial 
cluster, many firms can realize such economic gains. In addition to the efficiency gains, industrial clusters 
enjoy at least three more well-known major benefits: access to markets, labor market pooling, and 
technological spillovers (Krugman 1991; Marshall 1920). These benefits, also referred to in the literature 
as “collective efficiencies,” can enable more entrepreneurs to participate in industrial production that may 
otherwise be inaccessible to them (Schmitz 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi 1999). Ruan and Zhang (2009) 
highlight a further key collective efficiency of the clustering mechanism: clustering can help lower the 
capital barriers to entry through division of the production process among firms, thereby enabling more 
potential entrepreneurs with limited capital to enter the production process and achieve returns to their 
investment.  
There is a distinct body of literature empirically studying industrial clusters and their impact on 
economic development (Bell and Albu 1999; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 2001; Gordon and McCann 
2000; Meyer-Stamer 1998; Nakabayashi 2006; Porter 2000; Ruan and Zhang 2009; Sonobe and Otsuka 
2006; Weijland 1999). Most of these studies focus on urban and peri-urban areas. Compared to the larger 
body of literature on Asian countries, studies on Africa are more scant, with a few exceptions. 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and McCormick (2007) present nine case studies of clusters across seven 
African nations. Over half of the case studies presented in the work reflect qualitative studies, focusing on 
secondary data collection or case study interviews with significant informants in each cluster. Of the 36 
clusters presented, only five are rural: one textile cluster, two furniture or woodworking clusters, one 
fisheries cluster, and one metalworking cluster. Overall, these case studies illustrate the importance of 
market linkages as well as the role of clustering in promoting innovation. Joint action and interfirm 
linkages are cited as key factors of success in seven of the nine case studies, highlighting the importance 
of linkages in cluster productivity. Infrastructure is also mentioned in all the case studies as one of many 
factors involved in day-to-day operation, but there is no rigorous assessment of the impact of 
infrastructure on firm productivity within a cluster. 
In a book of 10 case studies in seven African countries, Zeng (2008) describes the development 
process of clusters and illustrates some features of clusters in fostering technological innovation and 
knowledge sharing. The studies in Zeng’s book focus in large part on the origins of and mechanisms of 
overcoming institutional constraints to development in each cluster. Of the 10 case studies, only two 
address rural clusters specifically. The first examines the Lake Naivasha cut flower cluster in Kenya near 
Nairobi (Bolo 2008). Bolo finds that the major keys to success for this cluster proceed from a conjunction 
of natural resource endowments with excellent infrastructure connecting the cluster to the international 2 
 
market. The second case study with a rural focus is the Nnewi automotive components cluster in Nigeria, 
which is located in a rural area but is dominated by large automotive firms (Abiola 2008). Abiola 
describes how the cluster initially was financed through automotive parts traders’ own savings, but has 
expanded through connections to international supplier markets. Abiola also mentions (somewhat in 
passing) that electricity is so important to clustered firms that 98 percent of firms have standby generators 
and 79.5 percent of firms spend 1 to 20 percent of total investment on power generators. Both case studies 
mention the importance of infrastructure in the evolution of the clusters, but in a rather descriptive way. 
More quantitative evidence is needed to further test the importance of infrastructure in rural clusters. 
The two books show that clusters are ubiquitous across the continent and that the classical 
collective efficiencies of clustering in promoting technological spillover and market linkages hold true in 
the African context. However, the advantage of industrial clustering in reducing financial constraints has 
not been fully explored. The literature has yet to fully explore the production organization, structure, and 
mechanisms of clusters in Africa where formal financial institutions are generally lacking and 
infrastructure is often limited.  
To fill in the knowledge gap, this paper investigates an in-depth case study of handloom clusters 
in Ethiopia, with particular interest on the workings of rural clusters. Studies of clustering within Ethiopia 
to date have maintained a geographical focus on the capital city of Addis Ababa and nearby areas 
(Abdella and Ayele 2007; Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka 2006). Handloom weaving clusters in Ethiopia are 
geographically concentrated, in both rural and urban environments. In this study, we survey not only three 
urban clusters in the capital city but also six rural clusters in southern Ethiopia. This study supplements 
the already growing literature by providing evidence of clustering mechanisms even in remote rural 
Ethiopia, and by showing the impact of infrastructure on productivity within geographically clustered 
producers.  
Based on a primary survey of 486 producers and 154 traders in both rural and urban clusters, we 
map out the structures and linkages among producers. In the Ethiopian handloom context, steps of 
production are divided such that each firm can specialize in one specific phase of production (for 
example, weaving cloth). Yarn factories exist locally so that individual handloom weavers are saved the 
effort of spinning and dyeing yarn themselves, and traders travel from market areas to weaver locations to 
purchase finished products. Although the system may look fairly primitive, with only wooden handlooms 
and modest profits to each individual firm, the story of small firm specialization mimics the beginnings of 
the Industrial Revolution in western countries, and could hold great potential for further industrialization.  
There are four main areas in which the clustering method has helped Ethiopian handloom 
weavers to perform better: reductions in transaction costs through better market linkages; technological 
spillovers; lower cost of entry; and ease of trade credit through repeated interactions. In the Ethiopian 
handloom weaving context, traders need only travel to one location to purchase from numerous 
producers, while at the same time producers do not need to travel far to sell their products, saving both 
trader and producer marketing costs. In terms of technological spillovers, the proximity of firms enables 
new entrants to the market to observe established firms, allowing room for innovation among the new 
entrants. Those innovations stimulate the cluster as a whole, providing economic gains to the whole 
industry. The gains, in turn, help foster entrepreneurship among individuals who may become new 
entrants and thereby increase the production base across the cluster.  
Whereas the advantages of market linkages and technological spillovers are well-documented 
collective efficiencies inherent in industrial clustering, in this paper we highlight two additional cluster-
related benefits that are not fully appreciated in the literature: lower entry cost and access to trade credit. 
As each individual producer in the Ethiopian handloom weaving cluster is liable for only one specific 
portion of the production chain, producers need only purchase a wooden handloom, which can be a 
castoff from a previously established firm, to enter the market. According to our data, the median price 
paid for a handloom was 80 Ethiopian birr (ETB) (US$10), which is just over 3 percent of the 2008 
Ethiopian gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in current U.S. dollars (World Bank 2009). In 
addition, widespread trade credit among producers and traders eases the working capital requirements of a 
firm. In these geographically concentrated clusters, individual firms must interact on a one-to-one basis 3 
 
with one another constantly. Consistent with a repeat-game scenario, when firms interact repeatedly the 
probability of default decreases. If a particular firm makes a habit of defaulting, or otherwise delaying 
production, other firms will see this activity and avoid working with the defaulting firm. Therefore, 
traders feel more secure in providing credits (and vice versa among producers) as each actor in the cluster 
can see clearly when another actor fails to satisfy an agreement. In this study, we find that 47 percent of 
producers were involved in receiving or giving trade credit (of which 30 percent were both recipients and 
creditors).  
In addition to the collective efficiencies of clusters, in this paper we also examine cluster 
performance, particularly with respect to access to infrastructure. We find that access to electricity matters 
to firm performance. In communities with electricity, producers work longer hours thanks to lighting 
conditions. Even the poorest segment of the population can work in the sector through sharing lit rental 
space. Therefore, it is possible to facilitate cluster growth through infrastructure investment. 4 
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND DATA COLLECTION 
Handloom weaving is one of the most important nonagricultural sources of income in Ethiopia (Central 
Statistics Agency 2003a). According to the Central Statistics Agency’s 2003 Cottage/Handicraft 
Manufacturing Industries Survey, the textiles industry has the second highest number of establishments in 
the cottage and handicraft manufacturing industry (221,847), representing 23 percent of the total number 
of cottage and handicraft enterprises, with almost 55 percent of these located in rural areas (see Table 1). 
Across the nation the textile industry employs the second highest number of people among the cottage 
and handicraft manufacturing industries, following food products and beverages. This industry accounts 
for 23 percent of the total employment in the cottage and handicraft manufacturing industries, and 20 
percent of the rural employment in the cottage and handicraft manufacturing industries. Weaving 
enterprises make up 73.2 percent of the textile industry in number of establishments, and 42.8 percent in 
total number of workers. Table 1 presents figures on the other types of nonfarm, small-scale industries 
(Central Statistics Agency 2003b).  
Table 1. Cottage and handicraft industries  
Industry  Number of 







Manufacture of food products and 
beverages  524,172  720,897  358,009  497 
Manufacture of tobacco products  966  1,116  606  543 
Manufacture of textiles   221,847  296,737  154,797  522 
   Preparation and  
   spinning of textile fibers; 
   weaving of textiles
c 
162,398  127,036  134,452  1,058 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing of fur  24,137  32,402  49,676  1,533 
Tanning and dressing of leather; 
manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness, and footwear 
12,025  15,065  11,484  762 
Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
60,463  70,137  23,572  336 
Publishing, printing, and 
reproduction of recorded media  197  240  966  4,025 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products  1,117  2,124  2,273  1,070 
Manufacture of other nonmetallic 
mineral products  92,404  109,783  46,131  420 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
20,787  33,536  27,503  820 
Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing not elsewhere 
classified 
16,562  24,831  60,569  2,439 
Total  974,677  1,306,868  735,586  563 
Source: Central Statistics Agency (2003b). 
Notes:
 a In thousands of birr. 
b Calculated as value-added (market price)/employment. 
c Subset of “manufacturing of textiles”; this is where handloom weavers are registered. 5 
 
Handloom weaving is one of the few nonagricultural sectors with a discernable presence in both 
urban and rural areas. In both such areas of Ethiopia, one sees strong patterns of geographically clustered 
handloom activities. Clustered handloom activities are apparent in Addis Ababa as well as in parts of the 
countryside that have been traditionally associated with weaving.  
The pathways of the handloom weaving production process, although short relative to those of 
other industries, are complex. Figure 1 illustrates the production process, moving from input suppliers at 
the bottom to the weavers, then to local and regional traders, then to wholesalers and factories, and finally 
to retailers. Input suppliers include machinery, accessories, and fiber suppliers, as well as yarn dyers and 
spinners. Weavers source materials locally and sell their products locally as well. 
Figure 1. Handloom production process 
 
Source: Abdella and Ayele (2007). 
Note: Input suppliers include fiber suppliers, spinners, yarn dyers, accessories suppliers, and machinery suppliers. 
Handloom weaving technologies vary by the types of producers in the industry. Wooden looms 
are employed mainly by rural weavers and come in two forms: traditional and modern. The traditional 
wooden looms are made entirely of wood and are typically made using simple tools by a local handcrafter 
or by producers themselves. Modern wooden looms have been slightly modified to include limited metal 
materials for added durability and comfort. The second major type of weaving technology is the metal 
loom, which is usually made by a local blacksmith or skilled artisan. Although the technology is superior 
in that they are more durable and comfortable to work with, this type costs nearly twice as much as a 6 
 
wooden loom. Additionally, metal looms can be difficult to purchase if a blacksmith or artisan is not 
located within a reasonable traveling distance from the producer. 
In urban areas, the handloom weaving industry is fairly similar to urban industrial clusters in any 
developing country. The majority of producers operate out of workshops, source their inputs from all over 
Ethiopia, and may sell from established shops (four walls and a roof). Urban producers make use of 
improved looms and also tend to work full-time on handloom weaving activities. In contrast, in the rural 
areas, producers use wooden looms exclusively, and they tend to work on handloom weaving projects 
only during the agricultural slack season or in other spare time. Additionally, traders travel to one location 
in the rural areas to collect products, so individual producers need not fund their own marketing efforts, 
saving marketing costs for both the traveling traders and producers. In electrified towns in addition to the 
urban areas, producers also share workspace, reducing transaction costs for utilities and other services. 
Our study covers both urban and rural clusters. Survey sites include three cluster areas within 
Addis Ababa (Shiro-Meda, Adisu-Gebeya, Kechene-Medhaniyalem), classified as “urban” and referred to 
as “Addis Ababa” in this study, and six sites in the Gamo zone, 500 kilometers south of Addis Ababa in 
the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR). The Gamo zone is largely rural, and 
our survey sites were centered in the Chencha district (Figure 2), so we classify these as “rural” and refer 
to them as “Chencha” for the purposes of this study. The Chencha district was identified through various 
informal discussions with local handloom actors as being an area with prominent handloom production, 
with around 80 percent of rural households in that woreda being engaged in weaving in addition to 
farming. Within the Chencha group, all six sites are market towns with handloom activities, but only three 
of these towns have regular electricity and all-weather road access. For a full list of survey sites, see Table 
2. Regarding primary data collection, the survey instruments consist of (a) a producer questionnaire, (b) a 
trader questionnaire, and (c) a community questionnaire. The questionnaires are based on previous 
interviews and field visits as well as cluster research performed elsewhere.
1
                                                       
1 We intentionally adopt some of the questions and structure of surveys done elsewhere to allow for some cross-country 
comparison of the histories and strategies of similarly clustered firms in different settings. In particular, our producer and trader 
questionnaires have much overlapping content with survey instruments developed for children’s clothing and footwear clusters in 
China (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008; Ruan and Zhang 2009).  
 We reviewed both published 
and unpublished reports regarding handloom production as a prelude to the primary data collection. We 
interviewed a large number of informants, producers’ associations, producers, and traders to understand 
the cluster structure and function in various places before designing the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was further amended in the field after a pilot test. 7 
 
Figure 2. Study sites 
 
Source: GIS data from EASE (2004) 
Table 2. Urban and rural sample breakdown  
Urban Clusters (Addis Ababa)  Producers  Traders  Total 
Shiro-Meda (kebele 18, 19–21; woreda 11)  98  76  174 
Adisu-Gebeya (woreda 11)  35  21  56 
Kechene-Medhaniyalem (woreda 16)  62  0  62 
Total  195  97  292 
Rural Clusters (SNNPR, Chencha woreda)  Producers  Traders  Total 
Chencha  55  15  70 
Dorze  51  21  72 
Ezo   39  16  55 
Shama (Shama town and wobera)  39  0  39 
Mesho (mesho, kale shaye, losha)  64  5  69 
Zozo (seten borche, boyena tuppa, gendo gambela)  43  0  43 
Total  291  57  348 
Source: Producer and trader surveys (2008). 
The producers surveyed in urban clusters are classified into producers who operate from their 
homes and producers who operate as part of an association; classification of rural clusters is based on 
access to electricity. The sample size of each classification was determined according to the proportion of 
the sample population. The rural sample was divided almost equally between electrified and 
nonelectrified towns (Table 3), while the distribution of the sample in the urban study varied in each 
cluster according to the sample population of subclusters and types of producers. In total, 486 producers 
are studied. Of 195 producers studied in urban settings, 51 are from 15 active associations in two 
subclusters and the remaining 144 are households working at home. Of the 291 rural producers, 145 and 
146 are from electrified and nonelectrified towns, respectively.  
The second component of the study is a trader survey drawn mainly from traders who are 
working in shops, in the open market, and along the roadside. A total of 154 traders were surveyed, of 
which 97 were in urban and 57 were in rural clusters. Roadside traders are found only in the rural cluster 
in the Dorze area, and eight of them are included in the study. In this paper, trader survey data will be 8 
 
used to complement credit and production information from the producer survey. The third component 
consists of focus group discussions in 13 communities. Of those, four were from Addis Ababa and the 
remaining nine were from the Chencha district. The community survey data will be used to identify 
infrastructure differences between the various rural and urban communities.  
The Chencha district includes 45 rural and 5 “urban” kebeles, or neighborhoods, with a total 
about 12,045 household heads. Of these kebeles, only five are electrified. The district classified 50 
kebeles into eight service-rendering units; however, for the purpose of this study we classified them into 
six service-giving units in consultation with the district administrative office, medium- and small-scale 
manufacturing statistical authority, and other stakeholders. In Chencha, access to electricity and thin-
roofed houses are two of the many determinants of labor productivity for rural producers. They influence 
productivity in two specific ways: producers with access to electricity prefer to work longer hours using 
electric light, and the hut houses in which the majority of rural producers operate have thin roofs prone to 
leakage, which can contribute to significant quality control issues during the rainy season.  
One interesting feature of rural handloom markets is that a few traders from Addis Ababa, 
Awassa, and other major towns collect output in bulk over a few market days and supply it to the major 
towns where they base their businesses. These traders were mostly born and raised in the Chencha region 
and have family ties to the rural areas, but they base their business in outside towns. They collect products 
on each market day from rural markets and stay for a month or a few weeks, depending on the volume of 
product they need to obtain. Some travel widely, depending on the market for the products. Other traders 
who are based in rural towns also assemble products and sell them in Addis Ababa and other major 
towns. More than 95 percent of the rural handloom products consumed are bought and used (via traders) 
by other-town consumers. Almost none of the traders working in the Chencha district have trade licenses 
and very few specialize in handloom sales; rather, the majority mix handloom sales with other trading 
activities.  9 
 
3.  STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CLUSTERS 
Based on the survey data, we isolated several producer cluster characteristics. Three production types 
exist: household, rented workspace, and workshop. Household producers were more prevalent in the rural 
setting (see Table 3) than in the cities, both proportionally and in absolute terms. The types of products 
sold by producers in each category are listed in Table 4. The use of the products varies by geographic 
location and tradition of local populations. A gabi is a large shawl that may be used as a blanket when 
cold. A shawl is lighter weight than the gabi and is used like a scarf for colder outdoor weather. A buluko 
is a big, heavy blanket that men wear as a wrap when it is very cold (this item is locally quite common in 
Chencha’s mountainous climate). In urban settings these garments are largely ceremonial in nature, being 
used mostly for weddings and religious ceremonies. In rural settings, however, they see almost daily use. 
As the majority of Ethiopia’s population is rural, the market for such items is fairly large. Moreover, the 
handloom industry can be seen as a stepping stone to further industrial development and entrepreneurship, 
providing a way for rural inhabitants to move beyond agricultural income.  
Table 3. Composition of the sample 
   Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Total number of observations   195    145    146   
Types of producer enterprise             
  Household  109  55.9%  72  49.7%  114  78.1% 
  Rented workspace  74  38.0%  72  49.7%  32  21.9% 
  Workshop  12  6.2%  1  0.7%  0  0.0% 
Technology of production (# of producers)             
  Traditional/wooden  147  75.4%  145  100.0%  146  100.0% 
  Improved wooden  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
  Improved metal  43  22.1%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
  Modern/semiautomatic  5  2.6%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Note: “Electrified” versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR. 
Table 4. Types of products sold 
Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Gabi  Gabi (2)  Gabi (2,3) 
Netella (2)  Netella (1)  Netella (1) 
Shawl (3)  Shawl  Shawl 
Kemis (1)  Kemis  Kemis 
Kuta  Kuta (3)  Kuta 
Buluko  Buluko  Buluko 
Linen  Linen  Linen 
Pillowcase  Pillowcase  Pillowcase 
Bedspread  Bedspread  Bedspread 
Curtain  Curtain  Curtain 
Hat  Hat   
Fabrics  Handbag   
Handbag  Other traditional clothes   
Tie/kerebat, shirts, other traditional clothes     
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses identify the products that were most often cited in each category as being the most, second most, 




The average size of enterprise varied widely between urban and rural producers. For urban producers, the 
average starting capital was 194 ETB (US$22), whereas for rural electrified producers this fell to 95 ETB 
(US$11). The average starting capital necessary was less than the 2008 Ethiopian GDP per capita of 
US$328 (World Bank 2009). This finding is largely consistent with McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), who 
found that many Mexican microenterprises were able to enter the market despite credit constraints, as the 
start-up costs for small-scale enterprises were small enough to come from entrepreneurs’ own savings. 
Table 5 presents detailed funding information for each type of cluster. The most common method 
of starting capital across both urban and electrified rural clusters is from a household’s own savings, 
indicating that those taking part in the clusters had enough private capital to invest to get their businesses 
going. All categories of producers indicated that a minimum of 40 percent of their starting capital came 
from their own savings, ranging up to 86 percent for urban producers (Table 5). The second most 
common source of starting capital is borrowing from friends and family. At least 20 percent of producer 
starting capital came from friends and family.  
Table 5. Starting capital 
  Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Value of starting capital (in Ethiopian birr)  194.29    95.23    114.86   
Value of starting capital (in U.S. dollars)  21.68    10.63    12.82   
Source of starting capital
a             
  Own savings  48.4  86  45.3  62  41.25  51 
  Borrowing from friends and family  27.4  47  34.5  46  43.24  54 
  Loan from foreign bank of donor agency  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0 
  Loan from bank  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0 
  Loan from suppliers  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0 
  Loan from traders  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0 
  Gift from family  19.1  35  18.6  27  14.8  21 
  Loan from private money lender  0.5  1  0.9  1  0.0  0 
  Gift from employer  1.1  2  0.7  1  0.0  0 
  Loan from microfinance  2.0  3  0.0  0  0.0  0 
  Relatives/friends  0.0  0  0.0  1  0.0  0 
  Support NGOs  0.3  0  0.0  0  0.0  0 
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Notes: “Electrified” versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR. 
a The first column represents the average percentage of starting capital reported in each category; the second column reflects the 
number of firms reporting 100% of starting capital from this category. 
Trade credit between producers and traders is widespread in clusters. Trade credit is a term of 
deferred payment offered by a buyer or seller. For example, an input supplier may provide a trade credit 
to a producer through delivery of supplies while receiving payment in the future. Likewise a trader may 
receive finished goods from a producer and wait to pay producers until their products have been sold. 
This reduced need for operating capital makes it easier to enter the market, enabling a greater number of 
participants. Of the 486 producers surveyed, 21.1 percent of producers gave trade credit, and 40.7 percent 
of producers received it. Initiation of trade credit was bound by several conditions. Most important to the 
decision to provide credit or not was a history of successful business together. The average time period 
for establishing that history varied but stayed largely between 1 and 1.5 years. The rather low capital 
requirement for entry into the market reduces reliance on formal institutions, enabling a larger number of 
people to engage in handloom production through their own savings. Wide availability of trade credit 
further eases working capital constraints. Overall, it appears that cluster-based handloom production can 11 
 
occur even in the absence of the formal financial institutions that much of the literature deems necessary. 
This finding is consistent with the clustering stories documented in China (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008; 
Ruan and Zhang 2009). 
Production and Trade Structure 
Next, we examine the structure of production as it pertains to flows between producers and traders. 
Whereas most rural producers sold directly to the open market, with more than 90 percent of respondents 
acknowledging this channel, urban producers had a more varied approach with only 64 percent of 
respondents indicating that the open market was their main channel of sale (Table 6). Shops, which 
require a large fixed cost, existed only in the urban producer cluster for several reasons. First, since shops 
are more expensive to set up, only the relatively rich urban traders can afford to establish one. Second, 
shops send a signal of high product quality. Producers would like to market their product in shops 
because merchandise displayed in shops is usually deemed higher quality than that sold roadside and can 
therefore command a higher price. Third, in urban centers, the large sale volume can help offset the 
higher cost of shops. In the rural areas, producers rely more on the open market and visits from traders.  
Table 6. Sale of products 
   Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Method of sale (% of respondents)       
  Open market  63.7  93.8  99.3 
  Door-to-door buyers  8.2  2.1  0.0 
  Third party  14.9  4.1  0.7 
  Street stand/shop  13.3  0.0  0.0 
       
Most important buyer (% of respondents)       
  Open market (same town)  43.1  87.6  41.8 
  Open market (other town)  8.7  4.4  56.9 
  Shopkeeper (same town)  23.1  1.4  0.0 
  Shopkeeper (other town)  4.6  1.4  0.7 
  Visiting trader  5.1  0.0  0.0 
  Direct sale to consumers  2.1  0.7  0.7 
  Order by contract/third party  12.8  3.5  0.0 
  Door-to-door buyers  0.0  0.7  0.0 
  Other  0.5  0.7  0.0 
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Note: “Electrified” versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR. 
The main raw materials used in handloom weaving production are cotton yarn and thread. The 
flow of raw materials in the greater handloom production process is seen in Figure 1. The raw materials 
are generally produced locally, and the quality of the raw materials dictates what type of products 
producers can sell. Additional raw materials include coloring dyes, used for coloring yarn and thread for 
specific customized items. In terms of sourcing raw materials, the picture in Addis Ababa varied from that 
in the rural districts in that 98.5 percent of the raw materials were sourced from shops, whereas in the 
rural districts shops provided only 77.2 percent of electrified producers’ raw materials and only 58.2 
percent of nonelectrified producers’ raw materials (see Table 7). With fewer shops in rural clusters, it is 
natural to see that shops play a less important role in providing raw materials.    
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Table 7. Inputs of products 
  Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Source of raw materials (% of respondents)       
  Open market  1.5  22.1  41.8 
  Third party  0.0  0.7  0.0 
  Shop  98.5  77.2  58.2 
       
Most important supplier  (% of respondents)       
  Open market (same town)  2.6  24.1  19.9 
  Open market (other town)  0.0  0.7  28.8 
  Shopkeeper (same town)  91.3  69.0  20.6 
  Shopkeeper (other town)  6.2  6.2  30.8 
  Visiting trader  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Other  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Note: “Electrified” versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR. 
Quality Control and Conflict Resolution 
As production is dispersed widely among various individual producers, quality control issues are a 
potential problem. Among urban producers, an average of 2.7 quality control complaints was reported per 
producer in the last year. The numbers for rural producers were slightly lower (an average of 2.2 
complaints) for the last year. More interesting, however, are the methods employed by producers to 
correct quality problems.  
When quality problems occur, the involved party rarely uses courts to resolve conflicts. Among 
producers, police and court systems were never used to resolve a quality control issue. The vast majority 
of respondents in all categories made use of “talking directly with trader/buyer” as a method of resolving 
a quality control dispute, with 100 percent of rural producers and 97.67 percent of urban producers 
acknowledging use of that method of resolution in the past year. These results indicate the importance of 
unofficial means of conflict resolution, and the ability of enterprises in a cluster to operate in the absence 
of formal contractual institutions as described in Fafchamps (2004). 13 
 
4.  PERFORMANCE 
Having shown that cluster-based handloom production can exist even in poor areas, next we examine 
under what conditions a cluster performs better. In other words, does the government have effective 
instruments at hand, such as infrastructure investment, to nurture cluster development? The basic 
hypothesis proposed by this paper is that infrastructure improvements facilitate cluster productivity. 
Urban versus rural clusters, and within rural clusters electrified versus nonelectrified clusters, demonstrate 
different productivities based on the specific environment available. This paper proposes that labor 
productivity in clusters with access to electricity will be higher than in those that do not have access to 
electricity.  
As producers in different locations produce different goods, it is hard to compare the labor 
productivity of each good directly across clusters. To ensure that we compare the same products across 
clusters, we selected the most widely cited most important product in the rural areas, the netella, a 
lightweight shawl used as a scarf, which was also the second most widely cited most important product in 
Addis Ababa (see Table 4). Production figures are presented in Table 8. The average monthly production 
for the most important product was 25.31 units
2 in the urban clusters, compared with 15.55 units in rural 
electrified and 14.83 units in rural nonelectrified clusters.
3
To examine whether infrastructure has a smoothing effect on monthly production, we calculated 
the coefficient of variation across months for each location type (reported in Table 8). With a coefficient 
of variation of 0.05, the urban clusters had less seasonal variability than did rural electrified clusters 
(0.15), and distinctly less than the rural nonelectrified clusters (0.23). Our informal interviews with 
subjects indicate that the relatively higher variation among rural and nonelectrified clusters is likely due 
to electrified clusters’ ability to operate consistent working hours through access to lighting independent 
of the season, and to access collective workshops with sturdy roofs, which helps prevent quality control 
issues associated with hut roofs in the rainy season. In addition, this seasonality is related to seasonal 
demand, as rural products target the rural demand, which tends to be more seasonal in nature (rather than 
ceremonial).  
 Our results indicate that in the electrified rural 
clusters, on average, it takes 1.19 days to produce one netella, whereas in the nonelectrified rural clusters, 
it takes an average of 1.32 days. The price for one item in these two places was similar. This is consistent 
with our thesis in that electrified rural clusters are more productive than are their nonelectrified 
counterparts. In Addis Ababa, our results were slightly puzzling: the production time for one unit of 
netella was 1.61 days. This could be because the netella was listed as the most important product for only 
27 percent of producers. In addition, the unit price for the netella is 50 percent higher in Addis Ababa 
than in rural clusters, suggesting better product quality and probably a more demanding labor 
requirement. The most widely cited most important product in Addis Ababa was the kemis, the long 
traditional dress worn by women, which takes an average of six days to produce. Moreover, enterprises in 
Addis Ababa produce far more types of products than elsewhere, as shown in Table 4. As a result, the 
total monthly production figures for Addis Ababa are still significantly higher than those in the rural 
clusters, reiterating the increased productivity of these clusters. 
The average sales price of one unit of the most important product is significantly higher for urban 
clusters than for the rural ones, and again for electrified clusters as opposed to nonelectrified ones. The 
cost of raw materials is also greater for urban clusters than for rural clusters. The same is true of total 
costs in general. This probably reflects the fact that urban producers and traders are engaged in higher-end 
products in a setting with stiffer competition than those in the rural sectors. 
 
 
                                                       
2 “Unit” refers to one complete product unit. For a full list of the possible products, see Table 4. 
3 Table 8 reflects the average for all most important products as a whole, rather than for one type of product in particular. 14 
 
Table 8. Production 
   Addis Ababa  Electrified  Not Electrified 
Number of observations  195  147  146 
Average monthly production for top product (in product units)  25.31  15.55  14.83 
Monthly coefficient of variation (variation across months for 
each location)  0.05  0.15  0.23 
Average sales price of one unit of most important product (in 
Ethiopian birr [ETB])  114.67  55.53  47.56 
Cost of raw materials to produce one unit of most important 
product (ETB)  68.44  39.41  33.24 
Number of days taken to produce one unit of most important 
product  1.71  1.86  1.68 
Loan interest rate (last month)  2.54%  0.91%  0.63% 
Average other costs in the last month (as % of total costs)       
  Rent paid  22.8  25.0  51.3 
  Electricity payment  8.2  19.8  4.0 
  Water payment  5.5  0.5  0.0 
  Telephone payment  9.1  3.3  0.4 
  Fuel payment  0.0  0.4  0.0 
  Transportation (excluding fuel) payment  12.0  11.5  16.7 
  Office supplies payment  0.1  0.0  0.0 
  Wage paid  37.0  29.7  0.6 
  Insurance paid  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Promotion/advertising/design  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Shop/other maintenance  2.9  2.3  10.1 
  Tax paid  0.1  2.6  7.4 
  Storage payment  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Payment to meals provided to workers  2.0  1.2  0.0 
  Payment to security/janitor  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Payment for accommodation/food  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Other major costs  0.2  3.8  9.5 
Total costs (ETB)  148.46  29.65  10.87 
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Notes: “Electrified” versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR.  
1 U.S. dollar = 8 Ethiopian birr. 
To address the question of differing productivity between clusters with access to infrastructure 
and those without in a more rigorous way, we first perform a set of pair-wise t-tests between the rural and 
urban clusters, and then between rural clusters with and without access to electricity. An examination of 
average daily hours worked shows that workers in nonelectrified rural villages worked only 7.21 hours 
per day, whereas their counterparts in other electrified (but rural) villages worked 10.73 hours per day 
(Table 9). A comparison of rural and urban clusters yielded a similar result, with those clusters located in 
Addis Ababa, who all have access to electricity, working 10.3 hours per day and those in the rural areas as 
a whole working 9.03 hours per day. In a word, producers in clusters with access to electricity do work 
longer hours than their nonelectrified counterparts. 
Enterprise size was the next variable to be analyzed. Urban clusters, electrified clusters, and 
nonelectrified clusters have 1.83, 1.31, and 1.67 workers per enterprise, respectively. The small enterprise 
size in electrified clusters is largely because of more frequent sharing of lit workspaces. To determine the 
productivity of the workers in each location, we ran pair-wise t-tests for the average annual revenue per 
worker. We found that annual revenue per worker was significantly higher in the urban clusters than in 
the rural clusters (14,859 ETB/worker compared with 7,237 ETB/worker, significant to the 0.001 level). 15 
 
Given the higher operational costs associated with better-quality products, this finding is not surprising. 
Similarly, rural nonelectrified clusters had far smaller revenue per worker than did their electrified 
counterparts (6,021 ETB/worker compared with 8,461 ETB/worker, significant to the 0.10 level). 
Table 9. Productivity measures, 2008 
   Addis Ababa  Chencha
a  P-Value  Electrified  Not Electrified  P-Value 
Hours worked per day 
(average)  10.3  9.03  0.001  10.73  7.21  0.000 
Average number of workers 
per enterprise  1.83  1.49  0.003  1.31  1.67  0.000 
Average annual revenue per 
worker  14,859.38  7,236.93  0.000  8,460.75  6,021.49  0.021 
(in Ethiopian birr/worker)             
Average annual value-added 
per worker  4,427.22  2,168.72  0.000  2,543.74  1,796.28  0.086 
(in Ethiopian birr/worker)                   
Source: Producer surveys (2008). 
Notes: Value-added = revenue − fixed and variable capital costs + wage + taxes. 1 U.S. dollar = 8.96 Ethiopian birr. “Electrified” 
versus “Not Electrified” refers to small towns or villages located in the SNNPR. 
a All rural clusters, as a whole. 
Next, we calculated value-added, defined as revenue less operational costs and cost of raw 
materials, and tested the profit per worker for urban versus rural clusters and electrified versus 
nonelectrified clusters. The results are presented in Table 9 as well. Once again, the producers in 
electrified towns were more productive than their counterparts without electricity. An additional run of 
testing was completed with targeted measures for rented workspace producers as compared to household 
producers, with and without access to electricity. Starting capital for rented workspace producers in 
electrified clusters was significantly lower than that of clusters without access to electricity. Electrified 
clusters clearly have a greater incidence of migrants than do nonelectrified clusters, corroborating 
anecdotal evidence indicating a preference for electrified towns on behalf of migrants. 
 However, the simple t-test comparisons may omit some important factors, such as capital, which 
could contribute to the observed differences between electrified and nonelectrified towns. Our next level 
of examination was to control for capital availability per labor and other factors in multivariate 
regressions. We record labor productivity through two different measures—revenue per worker and 
value-added per worker—to test the robustness of our findings.
4
   (1) 
 The estimation regression for 
revenue/labor is as follows: 
where Y stands for the annual sales revenue for the top three most important products; L stands for the 
number of workers who contributed to production; and K stands for the sum of fixed assets, operating 
costs, and annual cost of raw materials. X is a vector of enterprise type and community and infrastructure 
controls (dummy variables for rented workspace and workshop, Addis Ababa, and electrified), and ε is an 
error term. Rented workspace producers are all considered to have a single worker (as each enterprise is 
made up of one owner/operator who is renting workspace from a separate entity). Fixed assets are defined 
as the current value if sold (in ETB) of major assets, specifically production equipment. Operating costs 
are defined as recurring monthly costs in ETB of operating the business, aggregated to a full year, and 
include (but are not limited to) taxes, utilities, insurance, and other costs as appropriate. Cost of raw 
                                                       
4 An alternate definition of labor productivity, based on labor hour production data, was considered, but due to missing 
observations, the dataset would have been cut by a third were we to include the labor hour specification, so we elected not to 
include it. 16 
 
materials is the self-reported per-unit cost expressed in ETB multiplied by annual production units. 
Operating costs and cost of raw materials are taken together with fixed assets because for these producers, 
in keeping with the low capital investment required for market entry, fixed assets play such a small role in 
production that they do not vary widely among firms. The main driver for profit is cost of raw materials, 
followed by operating costs, so we take these together as the overall cost of doing business. 
The second measurement is value-added/labor, with the following estimation regression: 
   (2) 
where  is the annual value-added;   is the total amount of fixed assets per enterprise; X represents the 
same vector of enterprise type and community and infrastructure controls; and   is an error term. Value-
added is defined as the annual sales revenue of the three most important products less the annual cost of 
raw materials and operational costs.  
Tables 10 and 11 report the findings from our initial regression analysis for labor productivity 
measured in revenue and value-added, respectively. Five specifications are presented in the tables. The 
first specification is for the whole sample, including a set of dummy variables: electrification, Addis 
Ababa, rented workspace, and workshop. In addition, the year the business has been established is 
included as a control variable. Next, we run regressions based on two stratified samples: the urban 
clusters (Addis Ababa) and rural clusters (Chencha). In the last two regressions, the Chencha sample is 
further stratified into electrified and nonelectrified samples. The coefficients for the “capital per worker” 
variable are significant in all the specifications in Table 10 and four out of five specifications in Table 11. 
However, the coefficients for the electrified variable are not significant in any of the regressions in the 
two tables, which is somewhat contrary to the simple t-test results in Table 9. To solve this puzzle, we ran 
a nonparametric Lowess
5
Table 10. Regression results: Revenue/labor  
 plot of labor productivity for both measures. Those plots are presented in  
Figure 3.  
   All  Addis Ababa  Chencha  Electrified  Not Electrified 
ln[(K + CORM)/L]  1.004***  0.970***  1.030***  1.045***  1.025*** 
  (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.042)    
Electrified  -0.042    -0.040                    
  (0.028)    (0.027)                    
Addis Ababa  0.065**                        
  (0.032)                        
Year established  0.003***  0.005***  0.001  0.001  0.002    
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)    
Rented workspace  -0.029  -0.004  -0.044  -0.017  -0.086**  
  (0.026)  (0.050)  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.041)    
Workshop  -0.085  -0.039       
  (0.071)  (0.077)       
Constant  -5.545***  -8.479***  -2.740  -2.437  -3.064    
  (1.861)  (3.066)  (2.193)  (2.721)  (3.231)    
Adjusted R-squared  0.919  0.892  0.920  0.932  0.906    
AIC  94.688  80.974  3.515  -45.024  40.253    
Observations  480  190  290  144  146    
Source: Producer surveys (2008), authors’ calculations. 
Notes: K is the total amount of fixed assets plus operating costs; CORM is the annual cost of raw materials; L is the number of 
workers involved in production per enterprise. Rented workspace is a dummy variable indicating an observation in a shared-rent 
workspace, with each respondent operating a separate enterprise. Workshop indicates a wholly owned building, operating as one 
enterprise. Workshops were found to exist only in Addis Ababa. *, **, and *** stand for significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
                                                       
5 A Lowess plot is a locally weighted polynomial regression that allows for more variability in estimation. 17 
 
Table 11. Regression results: Value-added/labor 
   All  Addis Ababa  Chencha  Electrified  Not Electrified 
ln(Fixed Assets/L)  0.292***  0.305***  0.336***  0.083  0.575*** 
  (0.057)  (0.082)  (0.096)  (0.127)  (0.150)    
Electrified  0.175    0.213                      
  (0.139)    (0.143)                      
Addis Ababa  0.461***         
  (0.147)         
Year established  0.007*  0.018***  -0.002  -0.006  0.001    
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)    
Rented workspace  0.206  0.091  0.236  0.333*  0.130    
  (0.130)  (0.247)  (0.153)  (0.199)  (0.234)    
Workshop  0.370  0.335       
  (0.348)  (0.376)       
Constant  -8.538  -28.716**  8.933  17.703  1.793    
  (8.305)  (12.711)  (10.080)  (15.734)  (12.854)    
Adjusted R-squared  0.215  0.201  0.066  0.012  0.132    
AIC  1417.979  538.485  877.034  439.922  435.566    
Observations  472  185  287  142  145    
Source: Producer surveys (2008), authors’ calculations. 
Notes: L is the number of workers involved in production per enterprise. *, **, and *** stand for significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Figure 3. Electrified versus nonelectrified Lowess plot—Chencha revenue and value-added 
   18 
 
Figure 3. Continued 
 
Source: Producer surveys (2008), authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The first chart shows revenue/labor versus capital/labor. The second shows value-added/labor versus fixed assets/labor. 
Both charts show the Chencha region. “Electricity” versus “No electricity” indicates small towns or villages located in the 
SNNPR. 
From the Lowess plots of electrified versus not electrified communities in Figure 3, we can 
clearly see that the labor productivity performance differs greatly among the bottom segment of the 
producers in terms of capital per worker. For enterprises with the smallest ratio of capital to labor, 
typically those with little financial resources, labor productivity is significantly higher for those 
enterprises with access to electricity. This trend seems to be more prevalent in measures of value-added 
per worker.  
Revenue is not a good indicator of labor productivity as it includes the cost of raw materials and 
operational costs. After controlling for capital and other factors, revenue no longer varies between 
producers in electrified towns and those in nonelectrified towns. To clarify the relationship of electricity 
within the different groups, we focus on value-added per worker, a better measure of labor productivity, 
by running the same equation as previously used but this time stratifying the sample into thirds by size of 
fixed assets to workers. We ran these regressions only for the Chencha region, which is considered rural, 
to bring out the specific impact of electricity and other infrastructure variables, as opposed to including 
Addis Ababa in the sample. Table 12 shows the results.  
The results are consistent with the visual patterns revealed in Figure 3, particularly for the bottom 
third of the sample. The value-added per worker regressions indicate that for the bottom third of the 
sample, enterprises with access to electricity are 60 percent more productive than their counterparts in 
nonelectrified communities. This implies that the electrification improves the productivity for those with 
the least access to credits. For enterprises on the lower end of the spectrum, access to shared workspace 
provides an additional 67 percent productivity increase over household production. This access to shared 
workspace and electricity provides opportunities for finer division of labor, greater entry into the market, 
and longer working hours, all of which contribute to higher returns.  
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Table 12. Regression results: Segmented value-added/labor 
   Bottom Third  Middle Third  Top Third    
Fixed assets/labor  0.275  0.809  0.723**  
  (0.304)  (0.498)  (0.330)    
Electrified  0.598**  0.239  -0.150    
  (0.255)  (0.248)  (0.266)    
Year established  0.000  -0.005  0.001    
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)    
Rented workspace  0.668**  0.165  0.062    
  (0.273)  (0.235)  (0.258)    
Constant  5.204  14.459  1.375    
  (16.943)  (18.117)  (17.392)    
Adjusted R-squared  0.109  -0.003  0.016    
AIC  291.545  286.655  300.335    
Observations  95  97  95    
Source: Producer survey (2008), authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The sample for Chencha was divided into thirds based on the size of the capital-to-labor ratio. 
*, **, and *** stand for significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
In theory, towns with access to electricity’s improved productivity should take on production, 
whereas those towns with no such access should focus on other activities. However, it should be noted 
that handloom weaving is primarily a supplemental activity for many producers who also engage in 
farming and livestock production. Our comparison in productivity is limited to only handloom activities. 
As weaving offers a relatively inexpensive option for supplementing income even without infrastructure 
improvements, producers in nonelectrified areas are unlikely to cease production in the short term even in 
the face of competition from more productive producers in electrified towns. 20 
 
5.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The study presents primary data describing cluster activities in Ethiopia. It differs from other industrial 
clustering studies in that it covers both rural and urban clusters in an African country in detail, an area that 
researchers have previously given only limited attention. Rural clustering is an understudied topic, 
particularly in the context of African developing countries. With the lowered cost of entry afforded by the 
division of production steps along with the market access and other cost reductions that come with 
clustering, clustering is a viable mode of improving nonfarm incomes in rural areas, which are often 
financially constrained.  
Our study shows that cluster activities can survive even in harsh environments with no formal 
institutions and limited infrastructure. Further, clustered activities like handloom weaving can serve as 
gateways to entrepreneurship and industrial development. Entrepreneurs are able to seek new production 
structures to circumvent the constraints they face. With the lower cost of entry inherent in the clustering 
mode of production, as shown by the relatively small capital investment required by handloom weaving 
enterprises in this study, many potential entrepreneurs with limited financial resources can engage in 
productive nonfarm activities that add to overall household income. The use of trade credit helps 
entrepreneurs ease the constraints of operating capital necessary to run their business.  
Despite the high degree of adaptability inherent in the organizational structure of clusters, 
improvements in infrastructure can further boost labor productivity. Clusters with access to electricity can 
work longer hours, increasing labor productivity. Electricity enables many poor producers who otherwise 
could not afford to participate in the marketplace to share workspace with access to light at rather low 
cost. Both average revenues and value-added per worker are higher for clusters with access to 
infrastructure. Even after controlling for other factors, it is evident that access to electricity greatly 
contributes to higher labor productivity for those with limited financial assets.  
Within the African context, the promotion of less-capital-intensive production systems can be 
extremely useful when capital markets are less developed and most entrepreneurs have limited financial 
resources. The clustering production structure provides a way for potential entrepreneurs to participate in 
nonfarm activities, particularly in the rural sector. Further research is needed to examine the origins and 
evolution of clusters as well as ways to facilitate their growth.    21 
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